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The Allure and Danger of Practicing Law as 
Taxonomy 
Marcia L. McCormick* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This country’s approaches to the problem of discrimination, 
the laws we have enacted to resolve that problem, and the way 
that courts have interpreted those laws have been extensively 
criticized.1  While these critiques are related and form some of 
the basis for the critique presented here, this article accepts for 
the moment the positive law and structure already in place.2  
Rather than attempting to provide any definitive answer to these 
large issues, which is a project for another day, this article 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  For their 
suggestions, assistance with resources, and comments on prior drafts of this article, I would 
like to thank Katharine Baker, Mark Bauer, Howard Eglit, Doug Godfrey, Sanford 
Greenberg, Dan Hamilton, Sarah Harding, Hal Krent, Martin Malin, Nancy Marder, Joe 
Morrissey, John O’Connell, Michael Pardo, Joan Steinman, Mary Rose Strubbe, and 
Carolyn Shapiro.  I would also like to thank all of the members of the Chicago-Kent faculty 
who participated in a workshop on this paper.  Thanks, as well, to Paul Mollica, who 
allowed me to use his summary of employment discrimination cases, which was a valuable 
research tool.  Finally, thank you to David Leavitt for outstanding research assistance.  Any 
errors, technical or substantive, are mine alone. 
 1. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 2-43 (2001) [hereinafter 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY] (providing a feminist critique of formal equality in the 
context of sex discrimination law); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF 
THE STATE]; Derrick Bell, An Allegorical Critique of the United States Civil Rights Model, 
in DISCRIMINATION:  THE LIMITS OF LAW 3, 11 (Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds., 
1992); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law:  The View from 1989, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter 
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law]; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination]; D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets:  Title VII, Equality, and 
the Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2334-44 (1994); Robert Post, Prejudicial 
Appearances:  The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-19 
(2000). 
 2. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that the only way to correct our approach to 
discrimination is to develop an entirely new socio-legal approach. 
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focuses more narrowly on the basic framework for evaluating 
employment discrimination cases at the summary judgment 
stage, and suggests a way to reform that framework with the 
goal of developing a more workable model. 
One of the things that we all learn in law school is that 
lawyers love multi-part tests, multi-factor analyses, and shifting 
burdens.  We love to break problems into smaller and smaller 
pieces, and then rearrange those pieces to best serve our 
purposes.  Perhaps we use this process as a way to establish 
order in a chaotic world or as a way to make our subjective 
judgments seem more scientific.  Perhaps it is a way to feel like 
we are using the expertise we spent so much time, sweat, and 
money developing.  Perhaps it just makes us feel smart.  
Whatever the reason, the process is as natural to us as breathing. 
But what happens when we get so caught up in the process 
that we lose sight of the ends that process was originally 
designed to serve?  It would seem that when the means become 
self-serving or when they actually frustrate the ends they were 
originally intended to serve, we must discard them and refocus 
on a new way to serve those ends.  To do otherwise would not 
only frustrate achieving the desired ends, but also might 
camouflage the fact that the ends are not actually being served.  
Sometimes, we have to start over from scratch. 
We have reached this point in employment discrimination.  
The multi-part, burden-shifting test designed as a “sensible, 
orderly way to evaluate the evidence”3 in an employment 
discrimination case has taken over how we define 
discrimination, and the Supreme Court itself has finally fallen 
into the trap.  It is not necessarily that the test is too difficult for 
courts to apply.4  On the contrary, the McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
 
 3. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).  The test was created 
by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and is 
commonly referred to as the “McDonnell Douglas” test.  See infra notes 61-81 and 
accompanying text. 
 4. Several scholars have argued that the McDonnell Douglas test is too difficult to 
apply, and cite to cases in which courts bemoan the difficult time they are having.  See, 
e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas:  A Simplified 
Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 660-73 
(1998); Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Meaning of Discrimination:  Why Courts Have Erred in 
Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer’s Action Was 
Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 342 n.45 (1999); Deborah C. 
Malamud, The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 
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v. Green5 test [hereinafter “McDonnell Douglas test”] is 
satisfying, even fun, to apply and encourages lawyers and courts 
to get so caught up in principles promoted by the test that they 
lose sight of the law.  Rather than being a way to assess the 
evidence in order to discover whether an inference can be made 
that the law has been violated, the test has replaced the law and 
redefined what discrimination means.  By eclipsing the law, the 
test has made it nearly impossible to combat discrimination in 
all but the most egregious cases.  Thus, it is time to recalibrate 
how we view the evidence that might prove discrimination in 
order to reorient ourselves to what discrimination actually is. 
Part II of this article examines “discrimination” by looking 
at legal definitions and to the work of social psychologists.  Part 
III then traces the development of the current analytical structure 
for employment discrimination cases.  Part IV explains how the 
ubiquity of the current test has caused courts to substitute it for 
the laws they are supposed to apply, resulting in the 
misapplication of antidiscrimination laws and an overreliance on 
summary judgment.  Finally, Part V proposes reformulating the 
test, making it clear that in summary judgment proceedings or 
proceedings to set aside a judgment, the explicit question for the 
court should be:  would a minimally rational factfinder be 
required to find that the employer took an adverse employment 
action against the plaintiff solely for reasons unrelated to 
discrimination or discriminatory beliefs?  In other words, only if 
a minimally rational factfinder were required to find that the 
employer acted solely for reasons unrelated to discrimination 
would the employer be granted summary judgment or the 
judgment of the jury be set aside.  Otherwise, the case should 
either proceed to a trial, or the judgment of the jury should 
stand.  At trial, the trier of fact should focus simply on whether 
the plaintiff has shown that the employer took the adverse job 
action at least in part for a reason related to discrimination.  This 
test restores the original understanding of courts that employers 
 
2232-39 (1995).  I would submit that the problem is not that the test itself is difficult to 
apply; instead, courts simply do not believe that satisfying the test is enough to prove 
discrimination.  Accord Robert J. Gregory, There is Life in That Old (I Mean, More 
“Senior”) Dog Yet:  The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 423-24 (1994). 
 5. 411 U.S. 792; see supra note 3. 
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generally act for some reason, and, when the most common 
reasons for an adverse employment action are rejected, all that 
remains is an inference that discrimination was the real reason.  
The ultimate burden on the plaintiff would be the same, and the 
employer would retain the same opportunity to argue that it had 
a legitimate reason for the action taken.  However, the plaintiff 
would have a greater chance to influence how the court defines 
discrimination, and the court’s perspective would better reflect 
the pervasive and subtle nature of discrimination in the 
workplace. 
II.  DISCRIMINATION 
Discrimination, at its most basic and benign level, is the act 
of differentiating.6  We discriminate all of the time in order to 
function.7  In a positive sense, we discriminate between foods 
that are poisonous and those which are not in order to live.  In a 
less beneficial, but still benign sense, we discriminate between 
the colors we like and those which we do not in decorating our 
living spaces.  In a legal sense, we typically use discrimination 
to mean the unequal treatment of people, an act that often has 
far-reaching effects.  While this is an informal definition of 
discrimination that most people would agree on, there is no 
societal consensus on what kind of discrimination the law 
should prohibit. 
Players within the United States legal system have a rather 
narrow definition of equality and a narrow view of the role that 
government may legitimately play in ensuring equality.  As a 
general rule, our legal system tends to protect equality of 
opportunity, or formal equality, rather than substantive equality.8  
As a result, our working definition of illegal discrimination 
focuses on what is in the mind of a particular decision-maker at 
 
 6. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 411 (4th ed. 2000) (defining 
discrimination as “distinguishing differences”). 
 7. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1163-64 (1995). 
 8. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 41 (2d ed. 
1980); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 1, at 215-34.  Other 
scholars have labeled this distinction as deliberate exclusion rather than structural or 
institutional discrimination.  See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467-69 (2001). 
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the time a decision is made.9  Illegal discrimination is generally 
thought of, in a doctrinal sense, as the self-aware,10 intentional 
treatment of a particular person because of a single-dimensioned 
characteristic that is both irrelevant, at least to the decision being 
made, and also outside of the person’s control.11  This is the type 
of discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause has been 
interpreted to prohibit, and this model has been the basis for our 
antidiscrimination statutes. 
While this intentional discrimination model is the 
paradigm, legislators, courts, and scholars have recognized that 
the government might appropriately work to provide a more 
substantive equality.12  This approach tends to focus on the 
effects of particular actions, rather than on the intent of the 
actors.13  As a result, some actions will be considered illegal 
discrimination if their effects perpetuate a system of inequality, 
even if the actors did not have the specific, fully self-aware 
intent to treat people badly based on a prohibited characteristic. 
This latter model more accurately reflects how we as 
 
 9. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1168-77.  The focus changes just a little when the 
validity of legislation is at issue.  See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).  
Rather than looking at the intent of the legislators, we look primarily to the words of the 
legislation to evaluate discriminatory purpose.  Id.  Similarly, when the application of 
legislation is challenged, we look to the patterns of application and use those to infer 
discriminatory purpose.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
 10. Linda Hamilton Krieger calls this “transparency of mind,” or a person’s ability to 
accurately identify why that person made a particular decision.  See Krieger, supra note 7, 
at 1167, 1185-86.  This rule is applied differently when legislation, rather than an 
individual action, is being analyzed.  See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25.  For legislation, the 
real intent of any particular legislator is irrelevant, and it is the language of the legislation 
that matters.  Id. 
 11. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:  The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288, 291-94 (1997). 
 12. An example of a legislative effort to provide substantive equality might be the 
disparate impact provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2) (2000).  Cases interpreting this provision focus on the effects of employer actions.  
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  An additional example of a court 
focusing on effects rather than intent is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
in which the Supreme Court looked at the effects of racial segregation in education and 
determined that such segregation caused harm and was unconstitutional.  For examples of 
scholarly discussions of substantive equality, see Kimberle’ Williams Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1341 (1988); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 1, at 
124-26. 
 13. See supra note 12. 
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humans actually discriminate.14  The things in our world contain 
infinite variations and if we were constantly confronted with 
having to process the impact of each variation we would not be 
able to function.15  To cope, we define categories of things, and 
then quickly sort that which we encounter into those established 
categories.16  We then use the definition of the categories to 
explain what the “thing” we have encountered is, and how it is 
likely to act or be acted upon.17 
Assigning a “thing” to a group or creating group identity 
has far-reaching effects.  For instance, we perceive objects 
belonging to a defined group as more similar to each other, and 
more unlike things outside of the group, than we would if the 
objects were not attached to a group.18  Studies have shown that 
when individuals are assigned group identities, even on an 
arbitrary basis, these effects are personalized:  the individuals 
see members of their own group (the ingroup) as more like 
themselves, and others (the outgroup) as more different from 
themselves than they would in the absence of the group 
identity.19  Additionally, they are much less able to see 
 
 14. The former view of discrimination may actually have been an accurate model of 
how people discriminated when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  Ann C. 
McGinley, ¡Viva la Évolucion!:  Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 418, 426-27 (2000) (suggesting that overt discrimination was 
prevalent until 1964, after which people learned not to engage in such discrimination but 
were not made to examine their cognitive processes to root out stereotypes and more subtle 
forms of discrimination). 
 15. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977). 
 16. See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). 
 17. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188-89. 
 18. See id. at 1186 (citing studies by:  Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast 
as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956); Henri Tajfel, 
Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83-86 (1969); and Henri Tajfel & 
A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 
(1963)). 
 19. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism:  The Subtle Side of Intergroup 
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT:  BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 
160, 161-62, 167-68 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Anne Locksley 
et al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior:  Extinguishing the Minimal 
Intergroup Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776-83 
(1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group:  Categorization and Intergroup 
Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 
217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981). 
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differences among members of the outgroup.20  Groups are 
created by the salience of characteristics.  Once a characteristic 
becomes salient (matters or makes a difference), like gender or 
race, that characteristic defines a group; however, individuals 
define what is salient in any given context.21 
These cognitive structures create the tendency to 
stereotype, and stereotypes are essentially cognitive shortcuts 
that link personal traits with group membership, in order “to 
simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining 
information about people in memory.”22  Once set, stereotypes 
bias “in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, 
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other 
people” and influence judgment continuously.23  Like salience, 
which defines groupness in the first place, we decide what 
behaviors to attribute to particular groups.24 
Stereotypes create expectations that bias the way 
individuals perceive others, remember things about others, and 
assign cause to the actions of others.25  We determine whether a 
particular person is suited for a job by comparing the stereotypes 
we associate with that person to the stereotypes we associate 
with the job.26  We also tend to remember the things a person 
 
 20. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping:  An 
Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 
131 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). 
 21. That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice 
about what characteristics matter.  Conscious adoption could happen, but it is also likely 
that individuals absorb information from exposure to the culture in which they live.  See 
HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973). 
 22. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1187-88; see also Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate 
Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321-22 (2000).  While this 
description of what stereotypes are may sound very benign, stereotypes in a society with 
power imbalances such as ours operate to perpetuate and even aggravate such imbalances. 
 23. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188. 
 24. Again, this decision could be consciously adopted or learned through exposure to 
culture.  David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 
1979). 
 25. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1200-09. 
 26. Id. at 1200-04.  Krieger uses the example of a small woman with paralegal 
training and a large man with physical education training both applying for the position of 
police officer to illustrate this point.  Id. at 1200.  If our stereotype of a police officer 
includes a physically imposing person, we would be more likely to perceive the large man 
as a better candidate.  Id. at 1201.  On the other hand, if our stereotype of a police officer 
includes a person able to defuse tense situations or apply the law correctly to particular 
conduct, we would be more likely to perceive the smaller woman with legal training as the 
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actually did that fit our stereotypes of that person; we believe we 
remember a person doing things consistent with the stereotypes 
even if the person never did them, and we forget the things 
about them that do not conform to those stereotypes.27  
Additionally, we assign causes to the actions of people in 
accordance with our stereotyped expectations.  For instance, we 
assume a person who acts consistently with a stereotype did so 
because of innate characteristics, while we assume that a person 
who acts inconsistently with a stereotype did so because of 
transitional or situational factors.28 
Thus, discrimination is accomplished, at least in part, 
through an ongoing process of interaction that often happens 
outside of a person’s normal self-awareness, and which 
manifests in many small things over time, and may culminate in 
larger actions.  Yet, stereotypes do not function entirely 
automatically and can be controlled by conscious effort.29  
Therefore, even though some discrimination may happen 
without full, contemporaneous self-awareness, discrimination is 
still an appropriate subject of regulation by the government.30 
Based on this social science research showing that the 
doctrinal model of discrimination is inaccurate, a wave of 
scholarly criticism has recently focused on that model and the 
 
better candidate.  Id. 
 27. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1206-10; see also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, 
Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 38, 41-45 (1977). 
 28. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1204-07.  A good example of such attribution bias is 
given by Joan C. Williams.  See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:  
Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the 
“Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433-34 (2003).  Because 
women with children are presumed to put their children as their first priority, when such a 
woman is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that the presumed innate characteristic, 
priority of childcare responsibilities, was the cause.  Because men are assumed to put work 
first, a man who is late for work is assumed to have been caught in traffic, a transitional 
cause.  Id. 
 29. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244-47, 255-56 (2002); McGinley, supra note 
14, at 430-32. 
 30. See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 
7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 478 (2003) (analogizing liability for 
discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to invisible dangerous conditions 
on land); Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident:  Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 
1233, 1233-34 (1999).  But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 
1129, 1131-34 (1999). 
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courts’ adherence to it to enforce our antidiscrimination laws.31  
As the next section demonstrates, there is nothing in our positive 
law that requires this model, and so courts are free to adopt a 
definition of discrimination that comports with how social 
science tells us discrimination operates.  And yet, courts have 
done so very rarely.  I submit that the reason is because the 
analytical structure itself hides the issue of discrimination, so 
that litigants never have a chance to challenge the judges’ 
assumptions about what discrimination is. 
III.  LEGAL RESPONSES TO DISCRIMINATION 
The first legal mechanisms created to address social 
inequality and the problems of discrimination came at the end of 
the Civil War and during Reconstruction.32  While there were 
 
 31. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91-94 
(2003); Krieger, supra note 7, at 1241-48; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); 
McGinley, supra note 14, at 430-32; Sturm, supra note 8, at 468; Williams, supra note 28, 
at 433-37. 
 32. Before this time, states used the law to enforce inequality by prohibiting anti-
slavery speech, prohibiting the education of Black people, restricting the power of 
manumission, prohibiting Black people from testifying in court, and prohibiting the 
presence of free Black people in slave-holding and free western states.  THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS ii-
iv (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES]; 
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1861), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 29; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1677-
87, 1839 (1860), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 
32, at 20-29; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 948, 951-53, 970, 974-75, 980, 982-87, 
1006 (1859), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, 
at 14-19; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402, 1967 (1858), reprinted in THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 13; CONG. GLOBE, 34th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (1857), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, 
supra note 32, at 12; CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, 1598 (1856), reprinted in 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 12; CONG. GLOBE, 
33d Cong., 1st Sess. 234, 240, 1012-13, 1155, 1556 (1854), reprinted in THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 11; CONG. GLOBE, 31st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24, 288-89, 482, 1654-64, 1674-78, 2066 (1850), reprinted in THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 10; CONG. GLOBE, 30th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19 (1849), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ 
DEBATES, supra note 32, at 1. 
  The federal government also promoted discrimination by, for example, not 
allowing Black people equal pay for military service or for carrying the mail.  THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at iv-v.  The United States 
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some steps forward during the Civil War,33 the most notable 
developments came after, with the Thirteenth,34 Fourteenth,35 
and Fifteenth36 Amendments to the United States Constitution.37  
 
Supreme Court reinforced these kinds of measures.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (holding that Black people were not citizens and therefore not 
entitled to the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2 
of the United States Constitution); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 16, 21 (1852) 
(upholding as constitutional a provision in the Illinois Constitution prohibiting the 
immigration of free Black people to the state). 
 33. Massachussetts, for example, abolished segregation by race on streetcars and in 
schools.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 79. 
 34. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:  “Section 1.  Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.  Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 35. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . . 
Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
 36. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2.  The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 37. Although these Reconstruction Amendments are viewed generally as instruments 
of racial equality, the abolitionist and women’s rights movements overlapped significantly, 
and many hoped that women’s rights would benefit.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 
3d Sess. 708-10 (1869), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, 
supra note 32, at 346 (discussing an amendment proposed by Senator Pomeroy to grant 
suffrage to all citizens including women); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOJOURNER TRUTH 220-
33 (1996) (describing the overlap and the role Sojourner Truth played in both movements); 
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women’s Subordination and the 
Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 126.  One reason for the overlap 
could be that distinctions based on sex were well accepted and were used to justify 
distinctions made on race and color.  MILTON R. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
128 (1961).  Another reason may be that women formed extensive religious and secular 
welfare associations because that was encouraged by the cult of domesticity dominant at 
the time.  Taub & Schneider, supra note 37, at 162. 
  Although there was tension between members of both movements over the issue 
of which group deserved equality more, members of both movements argued that these 
amendments would grant equal rights for women, as well.  Their hopes were dashed when 
the word “male” was used in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that 
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The effect of these amendments was quickly narrowed,38 and 
 
representation in Congress would be restricted for any state where the franchise was 
abridged for “any . . . male inhabitants . . . , being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  This marked the first time that 
gender was introduced into the Constitution.  See H.R. REP. NO. 41-22 (1871) (reporting 
the majority view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit discrimination against 
women in exercising the right to vote, and the minority view that disagreed on the ground 
that voting was a privilege and immunity of citizenship), reprinted in THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 466-71; S. REP. NO. 42-21 
(1872) (reporting the unanimous view of the Senate that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments did not give women the right to vote and that denial of women’s-suffrage did 
not result in an anti-republican form of government), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 571-73. 
  The failure of the women’s movement at that time helped to set in concrete the 
conceptual division between protected classes and the tension created when a person is a 
member of more than one class.  For example, Black women are subject to discrimination 
because they are Black women, but under our legal categories, this is often found not to be 
discrimination because they are not discriminated against because of their sex by itself, and 
they are not discriminated against because of their race by itself.  See PAINTER, supra note 
37, at 224-25; see also RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDER-ING POWER xxx (Toni Morrison 
ed., 1992) (describing the interplay between race and sex in the controversy surrounding 
Anita Hill and the appointment of Clarence Thomas). 
 38. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights that owed their existence to the federal 
government and not some broader definition of “privileges and immunities.”  Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. at 37; see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING 
RECONSTRUCTION:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 
66-68 (1999).  The Court also held that the Thirteenth Amendment was relevant only in 
cases of chattel slavery.  MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR, THE 
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 240 (2001). 
  Subsequent to The Slaughter-House Cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations.  Act of Mar. 1, 
1875, Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336.  The Supreme Court found that neither the Thirteenth nor 
Fourteenth Amendments gave Congress the power to enact this law.  The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12, 17-18, 22-23 (1883).  The Court found that Congress lacked the 
power under the Thirteenth Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment granted only 
the right to be free from the most literal forms of slavery.  Id. at 22-23.  Congress had a 
wide view of its power under the Thirteenth Amendment to erase the “badges and 
incidents” of slavery, and the Court’s narrower view created lasting impediments to racial 
equality because slavery in the United States was based on a belief that Black people were 
inferior. 
Slavery as an economic system . . . was of small account compared with slavery 
as a system of racial adjustment and social control . . . .  Slavery was not the 
source of the philosophy [of the biological inequality and the racial inferiority of 
the Negro].  It merely enshrined it, prevented a practical demonstration of its 
falsity, and filled public offices and the councils of religious, educational, and 
political institutions with men reared in its atmosphere . . . .  The defense of 
slavery was of a social system and a system of racial adjustment, not of an 
economic institution. 
KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 10 (quoting DWIGHT L. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF 
THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S. 52 (1939)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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few efforts were made until the mid-twentieth century to address 
discrimination through law.39  Commonly considered the spark 
of the Black Civil Rights Movement, Brown v. Board of 
Education40 was decided in 1954, when the Court declared that 
racial segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.41  After Brown helped set the stage,42 and when activists 
 
  The Fourteenth Amendment was also viewed narrowly by the Court in The Civil 
Rights Cases, which held that Congress had the power to restrain only state and not private 
actors.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.  Scholars have criticized the Slaughter-
House Cases and The Civil Rights Cases for having eviscerated the purpose of the 
amendments.  See, e.g., VORENBERG, supra note 38, at 240-41; Christopher P. Banks, The 
Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON 
L. REV. 425, 438-39 (2003). 
  The Fifteenth Amendment has never been applied outside of the voting rights 
context.  Congress, however, had a rather broad view of its power within this context.  It 
enacted a law almost immediately after passage of the Fifteenth Amendment that, among 
other things, prohibited private parties from trying to interfere with anyone’s exercise of 
the right to vote.  The Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, reprinted in 1 STATUTORY 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS 445-53 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).  
The proponent of that provision argued that Congress had the power to enact any 
legislation that would protect against the states’ failure to prevent interference with the 
right to vote.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611-13 (1870) (statement and 
amendment of Senator Pool), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ 
DEBATES, supra note 32, at 447-48.  In other words, Congress had the power and the duty 
to enact positive protections to ensure that people could actually exercise the right to vote. 
 39. The federal movement for racial equality was abandoned in 1877, and most of the 
Reconstruction legislation was repealed in 1894.  KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 66, 69.  In 
addition, other than the Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, which provided that 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on 
account of sex[,]” further national efforts to address social inequality were generally 
unsuccessful.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX.  There were some states, however, that passed civil rights legislation.  
KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 130. 
 40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 41. Id. at 493-95. 
 42. Arguably, President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, formed in late 1946, 
set the stage both for Brown and for subsequent legislation.  KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 
70-72.  In its report, the Committee stated and recommended: 
The elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, 
from American life. 
The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three important respects.  First, it is 
inconsistent with the fundamental equalitarianism of the American way of life in 
that it marks groups with the brand of inferior status.  Secondly, where it has 
been followed, the results have been separate and unequal facilities for minority 
peoples.  Finally, it has kept people apart despite incontrovertible evidence that 
an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered whenever groups are 
permitted to live and work together.  There is no adequate defense of 
segregation. 
Id. at 72 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 
(1947)).  Additionally, President Eisenhower vowed to end segregation in the District of 
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undertook massive efforts at civil disobedience to integrate 
public accommodations,43 Congress began enacting 
antidiscrimination legislation again in 1957.44  It passed a 
second civil rights act in 1960,45 and finally enacted the most 
sweeping and widely used antidiscrimination legislation in 
1964.46 
A model legal strategy for civil rights movements evolved 
out of this history.  After an initial period of dawning, group 
awareness and local and national activism that resulted in an 
organized, coherent movement, a group seeking greater civil 
rights would focus its energies at the federal level by seeking a 
declaration from the Supreme Court that particular 
discriminatory practices violated the Constitution.47  If that top-
 
Columbia, and the Supreme Court considered segregation cases from the District before 
cases involving the same issues in the states.  Id. at 123. 
 43. Id. at 136-52; CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985) (describing the interplay 
between the civil disobedience and the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 44. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.  The bill passed after 
numerous compromises and after a one-person demonstration in the nature of a filibuster 
by Senator Strom Thurmond, which lasted over twenty-four hours.  KONVITZ, supra note 
37, at 74-75. 
  Among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 created a federal Commission 
on Civil Rights, which was to investigate allegations of discrimination in voting and other 
denials of equal protection, and which was to advise the federal government on equal 
protection issues.  Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 635.  The Commission was to last 
only two years.  Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 635.  The act focused primarily on 
enforcement of voting rights.  Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 637-38.  It was very 
modest, and disappointed liberals as too little and Southerners as too much.  KONVITZ, 
supra note 37, at 78. 
  The Commission issued its report in 1959 and found widespread discrimination in 
voting, education, and housing.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., REPORT 545 (1959).  The 
report also noted the complex interrelationships of these kinds of discrimination, and noted 
that Black Americans had become a sort of permanent “demoralized” underclass.  Id. at 
545-46, 548. 
 45. This act was also a modest one, due in part to a filibuster and other delay tactics 
that lasted eight weeks.  KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 84-89. 
 46. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of the Code).  Originally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
most well known part of that legislation, was to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, or national origin.  However, as a last-minute amendment by a Southern 
Democrat, proposed as a means to defeat the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited 
classifications.  110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). 
 47. The women’s movement used this strategy, beginning by trying to have the 
Supreme Court declare that women were entitled to civil rights under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution.  See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
130, 133, 138 (1872).  They were unsuccessful at first.  The gay and lesbian civil rights 
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down approach was not successful, the group would seek a 
constitutional amendment and/or federal legislation outlawing 
the practices.48  If those efforts were unsuccessful or struck 
down by the courts, the group would head to the states or other 
local bodies to try the same tactics and engage in more grass-
roots efforts.49  After some time and state or local successes, the 
group would again focus its efforts on the federal government, 
beginning with the Supreme Court and repeating the process.50 
This strategy was probably chosen to maximize the effect 
of group resources.  There is only one federal government, while 
there are fifty state governments, and thousands of smaller local 
government bodies.  Focusing on the federal government allows 
a greater concentration of resources.  Additionally, a declaration 
by the highest court of any jurisdiction that the jurisdiction’s 
constitution requires a certain outcome provides the most 
absolute protection.  For example, if the United States Supreme 
Court finds that the Constitution protects a particular right or a 
particular class, then no government within the United States 
may restrict that right or burden that class, and governmental 
bodies may be empowered to prohibit private parties from 
restricting the right or burdening the class as well.  Moreover, 
 
movement also used the strategy, although much later, and it too was initially unsuccessful.  
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there was no fundamental right to 
engage in same-sex sexual activity).  The disability and age rights movements also 
followed this strategy.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 433 (1985) (holding that rational basis review applied to classifications based on 
disability but striking down the decision at issue nonetheless); Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (concerning mandatory retirement at a particular age). 
 48. For example, women won the right to vote in 1920 with the Nineteenth 
Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  The anti-age discrimination movement won 
passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1971.  29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621-634 (2000).  The disability rights movement won passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1991.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).  The gay and lesbian 
civil rights movement, on the other hand, went straight to the states and local communities 
after the defeat in Bowers.  See ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY:  THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GAY AND LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 406 (1992). 
 49. After unsuccessful efforts at federal legislation, the Black civil rights movement 
focused its attention on the states and won passage of some civil rights laws.  KONVITZ, 
supra note 37, at 130.  Similarly, after Bowers, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement 
focused on gaining rights in state and local communities.  See MARCUS, supra note 48, at 
406. 
 50. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (discussing sexual orientation); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discussing gender); Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (discussing 
race). 
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once a court finds a right grounded in or a class protected by its 
constitution, neither it nor any other court can easily roll that 
protection back.51  Even if the right itself is not grounded in a 
constitution, a legislature may still have the power to recognize 
and protect the right under a more general type of power.  And 
so, even if the group is more likely to get a good result at a local 
level, for maximum effect it makes sense to focus resources first 
on the United States Supreme Court, then Congress, then 
individual state supreme courts, then individual state 
legislatures, and then other local governmental bodies. 
At least in part because of this strategy, which focuses on 
federal constitutional protections as an ideal, our model for 
defining illegal discrimination is the Equal Protection Clause.  
So, it is not surprising that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was passed, the Equal Protection model of illegal discrimination 
would be applied to Title VII,52 the employment discrimination 
provisions. 
Title VII provides, in part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.53 
 
 51. The Supreme Court has  
“always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because 
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce 
and open-ended.”  By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or 
liberty interest, [the Court] to a great extent, place[s] the matter outside the arena 
of public debate and legislative action.  
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  
 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2000). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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Section (a)(1) has been interpreted to prohibit only 
intentional discrimination, which has been labeled disparate 
treatment.54  Section (a)(2), on the other hand, has been 
interpreted to prohibit discriminatory effects, and that theory is 
labeled disparate impact.55  Even though disparate impact cases 
look to effects rather than intent, “the necessary premise of the 
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, 
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in 
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional 
discrimination.”56  In other words, some seemingly neutral 
policies have hidden biases so strong that the decision-maker 
may as well have used an explicit classification to keep 
members of the protected class out of the job.  Moreover, 
despite initially giving broad effect to the disparate impact 
provisions of Title VII,57 the courts have become progressively 
less willing to enforce those provisions.58  Part of the reason for 
 
 54. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988); Goodman 
v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 664 (1987); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & nn. 14-15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431 (1971).  However, the language of this provision would encompass a causal connection 
without intent.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (discussing 
the provision in causal terms). 
 55. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 56. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 57. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-34 (recognizing that Congress intended to prohibit 
employment decisions with discriminatory consequences, not merely those with 
discriminatory motivation). 
 58. Demonstrating its discomfort with a broad application of disparate impact, the 
Court stated in Watson: 
[T]he plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need 
to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force.  The 
plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is 
challenged . . . .  Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective 
criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in 
our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment 
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. 
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-
57 (1989). 
  In Wards Cove, the Court held that if a plaintiff could demonstrate that a 
particular employment practice had produced a disparity, the employer must then produce 
evidence that would show that it had a business justification for the practice.  Wards Cove, 
490 U.S. at 659.  The burden of persuasion, however, remained with the plaintiff.  Id.  
Thus, a plaintiff could prevail by demonstrating that the practice did not have a business 
justification.  Id. at 660.  Alternatively, a plaintiff could show that the same goals could be 
reached without an undesirable effect.  Id. at 660-61.  This rule brought disparate impact 
analysis almost entirely within disparate treatment analysis, with the shifting burden of 
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that could be that the Equal Protection Clause has been 
interpreted to prohibit only acts taken with a discriminatory 
purpose and not acts that have a discriminatory effect.59  
 
production and the opportunity to prove pretext alone, which is what the Court intended.  
See id. at 660. 
  The Court’s holding in Wards Cove was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which provides: 
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this title only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph 
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent 
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice 
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining 
party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice 
causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate 
to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not 
capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed 
as one employment practice. 
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not 
cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate 
that such practice is required by business necessity. 
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance 
with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of 
“alternative employment practice.” 
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business 
necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional 
discrimination under this title. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a rule barring the 
employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a 
controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession 
of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or 
any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or any 
other provision of [f]ederal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment 
practice under this title only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2. 
  Despite restoration of the burden of proof, some courts have resisted using the 
theory, and plaintiffs usually try to style their cases as disparate treatment cases.  See 
Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s 
Griggs Still Good for? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598-600, 620-21 (2004) 
(recognizing that lower courts are somewhat hostile to disparate impact claims and that 
plaintiffs rarely bring them, but not finding a causal connection). 
 59. While the Court was not explicit that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit 
laws or policies with a disparate impact until 1976, well after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was passed, it had never previously found that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited laws 
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Because the Equal Protection Clause serves as the paradigm for 
defining illegal discrimination, any deviation from that paradigm 
may seem less legitimate and more problematic.  Thus, most of 
the cases involving Title VII these days concern disparate 
treatment, and that is where this article will focus.60 
A. The McDonnell Douglas Test 
After Title VII became law, employers who intentionally 
discriminated quickly learned not to admit that they were taking 
the particular employment action based on the person’s 
protected class.  Thus, direct evidence of the employer’s motive 
dwindled.  In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,61 the 
Supreme Court set forth what is now known as the McDonnell 
Douglas test which assigned burdens and order of proof in Title 
VII cases that alleged discriminatory treatment but lacked direct 
evidence.62  Under this test, once a plaintiff demonstrates a 
prima facie case, the court presumes that discrimination has 
occurred.63  The defendant must then rebut that presumption by 
 
or actions with only discriminatory effects.  Washington, 426 U.S. at 245-48.  The Court 
did hold that there could be circumstances in which this discriminatory purpose can be 
inferred from disparate application or an extremely one-sided discriminatory effect.  See 
Akins, 325 U.S. at 404; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.  However, that discriminatory effect 
must be very stark to comprise evidence of discriminatory purpose.  See Village of 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358-59, 373-74. 
 60. Some scholars have argued that disparate impact should be used more 
extensively, since it is a significantly more flexible doctrine.  See, e.g., Shoben, supra note 
60.  However, other scholars suggest that courts are extremely wary of disparate impact 
because of its flexibility and, as a result, restrict its application severely.  See, e.g., 
Malamud, supra note 4, at 2263-66.  Given the Court’s decision in Wards Cove, which 
essentially pulled the disparate impact standard into a replica of the disparate treatment 
standard, I am inclined to side with the latter view. 
 61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 62. Id. at 802.  McDonnell Douglas concerned a motion to dismiss, but the rule was 
set up as a method “to govern the consideration of [the plaintiff’s] claim.”  Id. at 798.  The 
Court later made clear that this test did not apply at the point in trial where the factfinder 
must make the ultimate decision.  United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983).  At trial, the straightforward issue is whether the employer 
discriminated.  Id. at 715.  Moreover, despite the procedural posture of McDonnell 
Douglas, the Court recently made clear that the test is not used to evaluate the sufficiency 
of a complaint.  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). 
 63. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) 
(building on McDonnell Douglas).  The elements of the prima facie case laid out by the 
Court in McDonnell Douglas, a failure to hire, race discrimination case, were:  1) the 
plaintiff was a member of a racial minority; 2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; 3) the 
plaintiff was rejected by the defendant despite his qualifications; and 4) after the rejection, 
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producing evidence that the employment decision at issue was 
motivated by a non-discriminatory reason.64  If the defendant 
produces such evidence, the plaintiff must show that the reason 
given by the defendant is a pretext for discrimination.65  The 
plaintiff’s membership in the protected class need not be the sole 
reason for the employer’s actions; it need merely be a 
motivating factor.66  The defendant cannot avoid liability at this 
stage, but it can severely limit the plaintiff’s remedies if it 
proves that it would have made the same decision even if the 
protected characteristic had played no role in the decision.67 
If, however, the defendant fails to come forward with 
evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its actions, a “court 
must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact 
remains in the case.”68  While the Court explained what would 
happen when a defendant failed to carry its burden of 
production, it did not, at that time, explain what should happen 
when the employer’s stated reason is shown not to be the true 
reason for its actions.69  A split developed in the lower courts on 
 
the position remained open, and the defendant continued to seek applicants with the 
plaintiff’s qualifications.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  The Court added that 
these elements were flexible and would vary in different factual situations.  Id. at 802 n.13.  
The generic prima facie case could be styled as:  1) the plaintiff is a member of a class 
protected by statute; 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job or performing 
adequately; 3) the employer took some kind of adverse employment action against the 
plaintiff; and 4) there is some information that suggests the reason for the decision was not 
related to how the business should operate or on economics alone. 
 64. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.  The employer has only a burden to produce 
admissible evidence.  Id. at 255.  Although the evidentiary burden shifts, “[t]he ultimate 
burden of [persuasion] remains with the plaintiff at all times, to convince the factfinder of 
intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.”  Id. at 253, 256. 
 65. Id. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
 66. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-02 (2003).  Before Desert 
Palace, it was unclear whether, in a circumstantial case, discrimination had to be the sole 
reason for the discharge, or merely a motivating reason.  See id. at 95.  After Desert 
Palace, it is clear that whatever type of evidence proves liability, the discriminatory reason 
need only be a motivating reason and not the sole reason.  Id. at 101-02. 
 67. Id. at 95, 100-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 68. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
 69. The courts usually define pretext as a lie.  See, e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 
51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990); 
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602, 1187 (6th ed. 1990).  However the Supreme 
Court has resisted using this language, and pretext could easily include a facially neutral 
reason based on a prohibited assumption or stereotype.  For example, personal animosity 
would be a non-discriminatory reason for an employment action but not if that personal 
animosity were really sublimated racism or sexism.  Compare Staggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 
479 S.E.2d 561, 581-84 (W. Va. 1996) (recognizing that discrimination is not always 
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what they should do in that situation.  One group of courts held 
that the effect was the same as if the employer had submitted no 
evidence at all (pretext only).70  Another group of courts held 
that disbelief of the employer’s stated reason had no effect, and 
that the plaintiff had to provide additional specific evidence of 
discrimination (pretext plus).71  The Supreme Court attempted to 
resolve the split in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks72 and 
clarify that a court was not required to find in favor of the 
plaintiff if it found that the defendant’s stated reason was not the 
real reason, but that it could do so, because an inference of 
discrimination could be made from the prima facie case, and that 
inference would be bolstered by the fact that the employer 
offered only a cover-up.73  However, the Court only moved 
more courts toward the pretext plus test by, in a majority of the 
discussion, emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion.74  
The Court did resolve the issue, however, in Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,75 making clear that a court 
could infer discriminatory intent from the fact that the 
 
conscious), with State Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Sexton, 748 So. 2d 200, 213-14 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1998) (holding that there is no pretext unless there is a lie); see generally Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (recognizing that discrimination is illegal whether the animus is 
conscious or sublimated into something like stereotyping); Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91 
(recognizing that subjective decisionmaking can mask reliance on stereotypes and, thus, 
discrimination). 
 70. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988); 
MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Chipollini v. Spencer 
Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc); Tye v. Polaris Joint Voc. Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987); Thornbrough v. Columbus & 
Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, The 
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 71-75 (1991) (discussing in 
detail the circuits that had clearly adopted the rule, and those that had decisions reflecting 
both the pretext only and pretext plus rules). 
 71. See White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir. 1984); Lanctot, supra 
note 70, at 82-86 (discussing the circuits that had some decisions appearing to advocate the 
pretext plus rule). 
 72. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 73. Id. at 511. 
 74. See generally id.  Four circuits held that courts could make no inference from the 
fact that the defendant’s reason was not the true reason.  See Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 133 (2000); 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 56-57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Gillins v. Berkeley 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 
1332, 1344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 75. 530 U.S. 133. 
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employer’s reason was disbelieved,76 and that even though the 
presumption of discrimination dropped out once the defendant 
articulated a non-discriminatory reason for its action, a 
permissive inference of discrimination remained.77  Thus, a 
plaintiff may show intentional discrimination simply by proving 
a prima facie case, and that the defendant’s “explanation is 
unworthy of credence.”78  The McDonnell Douglas test has been 
adopted, and the prima facie case has been subsequently 
modified to apply to disparate treatment cases brought under 
other employment discrimination statutes,79 non-employment 
discrimination contexts,80 and other portions of Title VII.81 
B.  Despite its Flexibility, Courts Apply McDonnell Douglas 
Rigidly 
The Supreme Court originally designed this test as a 
“sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence,”82 
understanding that “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ 
testimony to the employer’s mental processes.”83  The logic 
behind the presumption created by the prima facie case was that 
the Court “presume[d] these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors.”84  The Court recognized that discrimination was 
 
 76. An employer might offer a false explanation for reasons other than to cover up 
discrimination.  For example, the employer might be embarrassed about the real reason.  
Still, it is reasonable to allow an inference of bad intent from the fact of the lack of candor 
in this context just as it would be in any other evidentiary context.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
147. 
 77. Id. at 142-43, 147. 
 78. Id. at 143 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
 79. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51-53 (2003) (noting the test’s 
application to the ADA); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 
311 (1996) (assuming without holding that the McDonnell Douglas test applies to ADEA 
claims); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 n.1 (assuming that the test applies to cases brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 80. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (applying the test to challenges 
that jurors were struck on the grounds of race). 
 81. See infra note 131. 
 82. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 83. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. 
 84. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.  In making this statement, the Court asserted the 
presumption that employers acted rationally.  Id.  Many scholars have taken this to mean 
that the Court was assuming that employers exercise sound judgment and have 
demonstrated how irrationally some employers can act.  See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 4, 
at 2255-57.  However, this cannot be what the Court meant by rational.  Since it required 
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pervasive but often subtle and that “the question facing triers of 
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult.”85  
Title VII embodied “important national policy” which sought to 
eradicate societal discrimination.86  At the same time, mental 
processes and states of mind are nearly impossible to prove, 
particularly in situations where the actions taken could have 
been taken for any number of legitimate reasons, because the 
person whose state of mind is at issue has sole access to that 
information.87  Yet, the adjudicative process requires a certain 
form and quality of proof.88 
Consequently, in an effort to serve the policy of eradicating 
discrimination, but in recognition that the intent of an actor 
would be difficult to prove, the McDonnell Douglas test does 
not ask whether there has been discrimination.  It endeavors to 
take that question out of the picture, and focuses instead on the 
acts from which we can infer intent.  The Court’s decision not to 
have the lower courts define discrimination on the basis of a 
protected class was probably deliberate.  Either the Court 
believed that there was a consensus, in 1973, on what 
constituted discrimination, or it recognized that there was no 
consensus and attempted to guide the lower courts by giving 
them the tools to avoid that sticky issue. 
Regardless of the exact reason, the rule has had the 
opposite effect.  Despite the Supreme Court’s expansive 
language about the subtlety of discrimination, the flexibility of 
the test, and the broad inferences that can be drawn from 
particular kinds of evidence,89 courts find for plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases significantly less frequently 
than in other types of civil cases.90  Furthermore, verdicts in 
 
the employer to merely articulate a reason that was not based on a prohibited characteristic, 
it must have meant rational in a much narrower sense, to mean only that employers must be 
presumed to know why they terminated an employee enough to articulate that reason.  See 
Selmi, supra note 11, at 326. 
 85. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Deborah Malamud contends that the Court created the standard to protect 
employers from a more reaching standard like that used in the disparate impact analysis.  
Malamud, supra note 4, at 2237. 
 90. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001). 
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favor of plaintiffs are more than four times as likely to be 
reversed than verdicts in favor of defendants.91  While these 
statistics could demonstrate many things, for example that there 
are more frivolous employment discrimination cases filed than 
in other civil contexts, most scholars who have done empirical 
studies on verdicts and reversal rates have concluded that courts 
find ways to rule for defendants in cases that fit the prohibition 
of Title VII and satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test.92  In other 
words, the courts are dismissing, granting summary judgment, 
or (if courts of appeal) reversing judgments in meritorious cases.  
Moreover, the reason cannot be that there is no longer any 
discrimination:  discrimination has not been eliminated; many 
scholars have documented the way that discrimination continues 
to operate in our society.93 
The pressure posed by the national policy against 
discrimination in the face of the difficulty of proving states of 
mind and the form and quality of proof required in our legal 
system is likely one reason that the lower courts have been so 
reluctant to find in favor of plaintiffs when the McDonnell 
Douglas test is applied.  Other reasons could be that judges do 
not believe discrimination exists or that to the extent it may, that 
type of discrimination is not the kind of discrimination that the 
government should penalize.94  In other words, there appears to 
be no consensus on what discrimination means. 
This differentiation between what types of discrimination 
should and should not be penalized has deep roots, reaching 
back to the debates over the Reconstruction Amendments.  At 
the time that the country was debating how (and whether) to 
 
 91. See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556-58, 566 
(2003). 
 92. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 11, at 283-84, 309. 
 93. See generally FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: 
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 75 (1995); MELVIN L. OLIVER & 
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
RACIAL INEQUALITY 45-50 (1995); DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL 
INEQUALITY AT WORK:  THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 
(1993). 
 94. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks:  Questioning the 
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994) (suggesting that the Court does not 
believe that discrimination really still exists); Selmi, supra note 11, at 284.  Amy Wax, for 
example, has argued that if discrimination operates beyond normal self-awareness, it is not 
properly penalized.  See generally Wax, supra note 30. 
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tackle the problem of race-based slavery, much of the debate 
over the Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights legislation 
focused on what civil rights were.  Those resisting any efforts at 
equality suggested that the measures proposed were targeted at 
social inequality, a vague concept that tied into the 
public/private dichotomy.95  Proponents of the measures denied 
that they had anything to do with personal prejudices that would 
force people to accept any member of a particular class into their 
homes or their circle of friends.96  Yet many feminist scholars 
have suggested that the public/private distinction is a social 
convention often used to justify discrimination.97  For example, 
because home and family are parts of the private sphere, 
intimate violence was historically not penalized.98  And while 
few would suggest that the government should be able to 
mandate who one’s friends are, there is often little clear division 
between the public and the private spheres.99  Sexual harassment 
in the workplace was once thought of as private because of the 
sexual component, even though it took place in the public sphere 
of the workplace.100  Conversely, same-sex sodomy was 
criminalized as a public wrong even when it took place in the 
private realm of the home.101  Thus, relegating the entire 
category of social inequality to a particular category of things 
not appropriate for government regulation merely legitimizes 
more subtle forms of discrimination. 
 
 95. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 344, 376-77, 379, 381-84, 565-
66, 616, 618, 726, 741, 900, 902 (1873-74), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 658-60, 670-71. 
 96. See supra note 95. 
 97. See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE:  TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 642 (2d ed. 2001); Vicki Lens, Supreme 
Court Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment:  1971-2002, 10 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 520 (2004); Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender:  An 
Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1551-52 (2004). 
 98. See generally RUTH GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES:  THE POLITICS 
AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 1-6 (1988); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE 
VIOLENCE:  THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 3-5 
(1982). 
 99. See Okin, supra note 97, at 1551-52. 
 100. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 
1-3 (1979) (discussing the issues presented by sexual harassment in the workplace). 
 101. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-64. 
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IV.  THE TEST’S ECLIPSE OF THE LAW 
Just as neutral policies can mask intentional discrimination, 
the structure of the McDonnell Douglas test has obscured the 
failure of courts to apply a stricter definition of discrimination 
than exists or than is required by our antidiscrimination laws.  It 
allows one to get bound up in the taxonomy of the evidence, 
placing each piece into a separate box and evaluating each box 
separately rather than looking at the whole picture to determine 
whether discrimination occurred.102  Additionally, it has allowed 
us to avoid grappling with the definition of discrimination and, 
for many courts, has actually defined “discrimination.” 
The best example of the McDonnell Douglas test’s effect is 
the split that resulted from St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks103 
and led to the decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc.104  Recall, the Court in Hicks held that a trial 
court is not required to enter judgment for the plaintiff if it 
disbelieves the employer’s reason, but it may, as long as it 
inferred from the prima facie case that the reason offered was 
not the real reason and that instead discrimination was the real 
reason.105  Despite this permissive language, many courts 
interpreted Hicks to mean that trial courts were not allowed to 
enter judgment for the plaintiff unless the plaintiff offered 
specific evidence that would alone suggest discrimination.106  
The courts got caught up in categorizing the evidence based 
upon whether it was direct or circumstantial, or whether it was 
part of the prima facie case or proof of pretext.  In the process, 
the courts lost sight of the ultimate issue:  do the facts as a whole 
 
 102. See Malamud, supra note 4, at 2237-38, 2319-20 (arguing that abandoning the 
McDonnell Douglas test would lead to a more holistic view of cases and creative 
understanding of discrimination in the workplace).  But see Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores 
Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (purporting not to use the burden shifting method, 
but limiting the types of circumstantial evidence, which might possibly be used to prove 
discrimination, to those types comparable to the fourth prong of the prima facie case or 
pretext). 
 103. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 104. 530 U.S. 133 (2000) [hereinafter Reeves II]. 
 105. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11. 
 106. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir. 
1999) [hereinafter Reeves I], rev’d, 530 U.S. 133; Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 
38, 56-57, 64-65 (1st Cir. 1999); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416-
17 (4th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). 
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suggest that the employer discriminated? 
The best illustration of the courts’ digression is the decision 
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Reeves.  Reeves 
involved a fifty-seven-year-old factory supervisor who was 
terminated after an investigation into employee timekeeping 
practices.107  He was replaced by someone substantially 
younger.108  Several months before his discharge, Reeves’s 
supervisor said that he “was so old [that he] ‘must have come 
over on the Mayflower,’” and that he “was ‘too damn old to do 
[the] job.’”109  After each side rested its case, the jury found that 
the discrimination against Reeves was willful, returned a verdict 
in favor of Reeves, and awarded him damages.110 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict, holding that 
Reeves had not presented enough evidence to show that 
discrimination was the reason for his discharge.111  After noting 
that the employer had articulated a non-discriminatory reason 
for its actions, the court of appeals failed to consider the 
evidence that made up the prima facie case and looked only to 
the age-related comments as potential evidence of 
discrimination.112  It found that those comments could not be 
linked to Reeves’s discharge since they were made months 
before.  Without those comments, the evidence showed that 
Reeves was treated like any other employee under investigation 
and that there was no widespread age-based animus in the 
employer’s practices.113  Thus, the court of appeals boxed each 
piece of evidence into its own category, and then used those 
categories to disregard the probative value of that evidence.  
When the Supreme Court reversed, it admonished the Fifth 
Circuit for rejecting the evidence contained in the prima facie 
case and found that when viewed as a whole, the evidence 
supported the verdict.114  The Court went further, as well, and 
directed that a factfinder could infer a discriminatory motive 
from the fact that the reason offered by the employer for its 
 
 107. Reeves II, 530 U.S. at 137-38. 
 108. Reeves was replaced by a succession of three people in their thirties.  Id. at 142. 
 109. Id. at 151. 
 110. Id. at 139. 
 111. Reeves I, 197 F.3d at 694. 
 112. Id. at 693. 
 113. Id. at 693-94. 
 114. Reeves II, 530 U.S. at 142, 146. 
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action was not the real reason.115 
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves resolved the 
issue in that particular case, it has not solved the problems 
associated with the boxing of evidence.116  Although McDonnell 
Douglas has been called an empty ritual because courts focused 
primarily on the pretext prong for a number of years,117 Reeves 
revitalized the power of the prima facie case.118  Courts are more 
frequently examining whether the plaintiff has provided 
evidence of a prima facie case.119  And, the elements of the 
prima facie case are being applied very rigidly.  For example, 
one way to show that the plaintiff’s prohibited characteristic was 
the reason for an employer’s action is to show that someone 
outside the plaintiff’s class was treated better under substantially 
similar circumstances.  Yet some courts have taken it too far and 
found this comparator evidence a necessary part of the prima 
facie case.120  However, that is not the only way to show that the 
prohibited characteristic was the reason for the employer’s 
action.  For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,121 
comparative evidence was unnecessary.  It was irrelevant that 
some women could become partners at the accounting firm.122  
 
 115. Id. at 146. 
 116. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 
61 LA. L. REV. 577, 592-99 (2001).  Zimmer notes that the Court in Reeves failed to 
address the process that the Fifth Circuit used in categorizing the evidence, and this failure 
means that lower courts continue to get caught up in the taxonomy.  Id. at 591-99. 
 117. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 4 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas should be 
discarded because it is an empty ritual that courts no longer employ). 
 118. See Zimmer, supra note 116, at 600. 
 119. See, e.g., Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Steinhauer v. DeGolier, 359 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2004).  In fact, in a case in which the 
defendant conceded that a prima facie case had been made, the Seventh Circuit 
nevertheless found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of one.  Davis v. 
Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 120. In fact, some courts even require evidence that a comparator was treated more 
favorably as an element of the prima facie case.  See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 
F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing a split within the Fifth Circuit concerning 
whether it was an element of the prima facie case but not requiring it); Suggs v. 
ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1996); Edwards v. Wallace 
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995); Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 10 
(D.D.C. 1997); see also Marla Swartz, Note, The Replacement Dilemma:  An Argument for 
Eliminating a Non-Class Replacement Requirement in the Prima Facie Stage of Title VII 
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claims, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (2003) 
(discussing how various courts have used and required evidence of comparators). 
 121. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 122. See id. at 233, 251-52. 
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It did not matter that men who exhibited the same behaviors as 
plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, were promoted to partner.123  The 
problem was that Hopkins was not promoted because she was a 
woman who acted too manly.124 
Categorizing the evidence is not the only way that courts 
and litigants get caught up in the principles that the McDonnell 
Douglas taxonomy promotes.  Courts are importing the test as if 
the test defines what violates the statute at issue rather than 
being a way to infer intent with the idea that discrimination 
operates in the background.  In fact, sometimes the test is 
imported into areas where it is simply inapplicable.  A prime 
example of this improper importation is retaliation under Title 
VII.  Title VII prohibits retaliation by employers for opposing 
any unlawful employment practice or participating in 
proceedings under Title VII.125  The only question relevant to a 
retaliation charge is whether the employer took some act and 
whether the employer took the act because the employee 
opposed an unlawful employment practice or participated in 
proceedings under Title VII.126  However, where there is no 
direct evidence of the employer’s intent, courts use the 
McDonnell Douglas test to determine whether retaliation has 
occurred.  One element of that test is whether the employee 
suffered an adverse employment action.127  While a modified 
version of the test could be useful to isolate the evidence that 
might show the employer’s intent, the courts have not modified 
the test to remove the adverse action requirement, a requirement 
that has nothing to do with the intent of the actor.  The circuits 
are split on what constitutes an employment action adverse 
 
 123. See id. at 236. 
 124. See id. at 251-52. 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).  Specifically, it prohibits employers from 
“discriminat[ing] against any . . . employees or applicants for employment . . . because 
[they have] opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because [they have] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a). 
 126. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the 
“Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 188-89 (1997); Stephen W. 
Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem:  Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie 
Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 381 (1997). 
 127. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (requiring the plaintiff to show that he 
was not hired in a failure to hire case). 
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enough, in the context of retaliation, to provide a person a cause 
of action.128 
However, no court has questioned the utility of using 
McDonnell Douglas in the first instance, particularly the adverse 
job action requirement.129  That requirement makes sense in the 
context of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from 
“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to . . . 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment . . . .”130  This language suggests that only 
discrimination that results in adverse employment actions will 
be actionable.  The retaliation provision, on the other hand, 
prohibits “discrimination” without any qualifiers,131 and thus 
mere differentiation should be sufficient. 
Another, even more glaring example is the importation of 
the test into the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  
FMLA requires covered employers to allow covered employees 
to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newly 
born or adopted child, a family member, or the employee’s own 
serious health condition.132  In addition, it gives employees a 
cause of action against employers who “interfere with, restrain, 
or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right 
provided under [FMLA].”133  Despite the fact that interference 
with rights is much broader than discrimination and looks to the 
effects of actions rather than the intent of actors,134 some courts 
 
 128. A few courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate that they suffered an 
“ultimate” job action, such as termination.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. 
Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 
1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997).  Others require that the action be “materially adverse,” 
although it need not be an ultimate action.  Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 
2000); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000); Heno v. 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 857 (10th Cir. 2000); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of 
N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1300 (3d Cir. 1997); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997).  The Ninth Circuit 
and the EEOC have adopted the view that any treatment reasonably likely to deter 
protected activity constitutes retaliation.  See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th 
Cir. 2000); EEOC, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8 (2002). 
 129. The approach of the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC comes closest to removing the 
requirement altogether. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2000). 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000). 
 134. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960-61 (10th Cir. 
2002); Bachelder v. America W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001); 
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have imported the McDonnell Douglas test into the FMLA.135  
Thus, many actions that could be said to interfere with an 
employee’s exercise of rights have not been found to violate the 
FMLA despite the act’s plain language. 
Finally, the taxonomy promoted by McDonnell Douglas, 
particularly the issue of comparators, has so fully infected our 
thinking about what discrimination is that the Supreme Court 
has fallen into the trap in its recent decision in General 
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.136  Cline involved the 
question of whether an employer violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) by treating 
workers over forty less favorably because of their age than 
workers over fifty.137  The antidiscrimination provision of the 
ADEA prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire 
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual . . . because of such individual’s age . . . .”138  
However, not everyone is protected from age discrimination:  
the class of workers protected by the ADEA is limited to those 
forty and older; which leaves workers under forty 
unprotected.139  The plain meaning of the two sections suggests 
that as long as a person is in the protected class, an employer 
may not rest decisions affecting that person on that person’s 
age.140 
This interpretation comports with the interpretation of 
 
see generally Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329 (2003) (arguing that the 
FMLA should be interpreted in the same way as the National Labor Relations Act, which 
prohibits interference with the right to organize). 
 135. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 768 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Nichols v. Ashland Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001); Brungart v. Bellsouth 
Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000); Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 
F.3d 1008, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000); Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019-20 (Evans, J., dissenting); Gleklen 
v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hodgens v. 
General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160-72 (1st Cir. 1998); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 
F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 136. 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
 137. See id. at 581. 
 138. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). 
 140. See Cline, 540 U.S. at 602-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cline v. General 
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469-71 (6th Cir. 2002); Cline, 296 F.3d at 472-75 
(Cole, J., concurring).  The primary meaning of the word “age” is chronological age—the 
length of time that a person has been alive.  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 33 (3d ed. 
1992). 
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nearly identical language in Title VII, which provides that 
employers may not “fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin . . . .”141  That language has been 
interpreted to prohibit decisions made because of a prohibited 
characteristic, rather than membership in a subset of the class 
defined.  In other words, white people may sue if they are 
discriminated against because they are white, men may sue if 
they are discriminated against because they are men, and so on, 
even though Title VII was originally passed to promote equality 
for African-Americans, women, and other disempowered 
groups.142 
The application of these principles seems relatively simple 
in the abstract.  In Cline, the employer decided to take away 
future benefits at retirement for those employees between forty 
and fifty based solely on their current age.143  This was direct 
evidence that the employer was motivated to take action solely 
because of age.  Based on the plain language of the statute, 
stating that employers cannot discriminate because of an 
individual’s age, this action should have been held to violate the 
ADEA.  Because it was a direct evidence case, McDonnell 
Douglas considerations should never have entered the picture.  
However, there was a wrinkle presented by Cline.  Employees 
over fifty would have greater benefits when they retired, and 
they retained these benefits in part because the employer cut 
benefits for the younger employees.144  Thus, the same action 
that harmed one group of employees within the protected class 
helped another group also within the protected class. 
The presence of these comparators confused the issue.  
Suddenly the issue was no longer the employer’s intent.  The 
employer’s intent was undisputedly to classify on the basis of 
age.  Instead, the question became whether the ADEA 
prohibited classifying on the basis of age when that 
classification benefited one segment of the protected class—not 
 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 142. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 143. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584. 
 144. Id. 
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just any segment of that class, but the segment with the greatest 
amount of, for lack of a better word, protectedness.  Even 
though the language of the ADEA was clear, the Court just 
could not conceive of Congress intending to protect all members 
of the class equally.  And so, in a very tortured line of reasoning, 
the Court found that Congress meant “relatively older age” 
when it used the word “age,”145 and that the members of the 
protected class were protected only when they were harmed in 
favor of relatively younger members of the class.146  This cannot 
be distinguished from Title VII by the fact that the comparators 
were members of the same class.  We know from Price 
Waterhouse that it is still sex discrimination if a woman does not 
receive a benefit because she is not womanly enough.147  
Certainly, no court would find that refusing to offer benefits to a 
group of Black people because they were not Black enough was 
legal under Title VII.148 
Further demonstrating the confusion engendered by the 
desire to look at comparators, the Court looked to one of its 
prior decisions applying the McDonnell Douglas test in an 
ADEA case for guidance even though this was a direct evidence 
case, and the test would not be used.149  In the prior case, 
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,150 the Court 
applied the McDonnell Douglas test to a case under the ADEA 
in which a fifty-six-year-old was discharged and replaced with a 
 
 145. This analysis was tortured because the Court failed to follow the rules of statutory 
construction, which it has been adhering to very closely for at least the past few years.  See 
Rafael Gely, Supreme Court’s 2002 Term Employment Law Cases:  Is This the Scalia 
Court?, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 254 (2003) (describing the Court’s recent 
adherence to the primary rule of statutory construction).  It began by looking to the 
legislative history, gave no weight to an EEOC regulation, and allowed the word “age” to 
mean different things in different parts of the ADEA.  Cline, 540 U.S. at 585-99. 
 146. Cline, 540 U.S. at 590-91. 
 147. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52. 
 148. Moreover, the reasoning cannot be explained along affirmative action lines.  
There is no good analogy to affirmative action.  Race-based decisions are valid under Title 
VII as long as they are made pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan.  See generally 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193 (1979).  However, affirmative action 
involves distinctions between classes, both of which might be protected, but not 
distinctions within classes.  This view that classes are truly distinct, and that they do not 
involve a continuum may be inaccurate, but that is the view embodied in the law. 
 149. Cline, 540 U.S. at 592-93. 
 150. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). 
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forty-year-old.151  The district court granted summary judgment 
on the ground that O’Connor could not make out a prima facie 
case of age discrimination because he was replaced by someone 
within his protected class.152  The Supreme Court held in 
O’Connor that the class membership of the replacement was 
irrelevant, and that an inference that age was the reason for the 
employer’s decision could be made since the replacement was 
“substantially younger.”153 
The Court in Cline took that point out of context, and 
inflated its importance.  It ignored its prior reasoning in 
O’Connor, which recognized: 
The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is 
discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age,” 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), though the prohibition is “limited to 
individuals who are at least [forty] years of age,” § 631(a).  
This language does not ban discrimination against 
employees because they are aged [forty] or older; it bans 
discrimination against employees because of their age, but 
limits the protected class to those who are [forty] or older.  
The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out 
to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so 
long as he has lost out because of his age.154 
Thus, the reasoning in O’Connor would have supported 
interpreting the ADEA according to the plain meaning of the 
statutory language.  But the end result, the discussion of the 
comparator, and the presence of a comparator class in Cline, 
allowed the Court to interpret the ADEA as if the McDonnell 
Douglas test defines unlawful discrimination. 
V.  THE BETTER TEST 
Given that the McDonnell Douglas test as applied is so 
flawed, and courts have proven so resistant to moving away 
from the most narrow interpretations of it, I suggest replacing it 
with a much simpler test.  Judges155 are just as prone to 
 
 151. Id. at 309-10. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 311-12. 
 154. Id. at 312 (emphasis in original). 
 155. Members of juries, as well, would be just as prone to cognitive bias as anyone, 
but I do not address them here for several reasons.  First, juries are made up of several 
people who must make decisions by consensus.  The more balanced the jury in terms of 
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cognitive bias and unreflective discrimination as the rest of 
us.156  Any test that fails to account for this fact is doomed to the 
same fate as the McDonnell Douglas test.  Thus, I propose 
coming at the ultimate issue from the opposite angle, to reaffirm 
the notion that discrimination is not merely an exception to the 
rule. 
In pre-trial proceedings or proceedings to set aside a 
judgment, the explicit, and only question for the court is whether 
a minimally rational factfinder would be required to find that the 
employer took an adverse employment action against the 
plaintiff solely because of a reason unrelated to discrimination 
or discriminatory beliefs.  Only if a minimally rational factfinder 
would be required to find that the employer acted for reasons 
unrelated to discrimination would the employer be granted 
summary judgment or the judgment of the jury be set aside.  
Otherwise, the case should either proceed to a trial or the 
judgment of the jury should stand. 
This formulation of the test requires no taxonomy of the 
evidence.  Rather, it requires the court to look at the evidence as 
a whole with the ultimate issue at trial in mind, just like in any 
other type of civil litigation.  Thus, it runs significantly less risk 
that the court will get so caught up in boxing the evidence into 
separate categories that it loses sight of the permissible 
inferences from that evidence. 
Using a test that is so much more holistic may concern 
litigants and judges that the lack of defined standards will fail to 
give lower courts sufficient guidance.  However, sociological 
research indicates that more complicated environments and 
 
class, race, gender, etc., the more likely that the biases of one group would be negated by 
the understandings of other jurors.  Second, judges are not employees in the normal sense 
even if they are state judges who are elected.  No one with authority can direct them in 
doing their jobs, with the limited exception of a higher court overturning a decision on 
appeal or directing a non-discretionary act through a writ of mandamus.  Yet, nearly all 
judges are employers, or at least must manage their law clerks, secretaries, and other 
assistants.  Thus, judges are likely to identify with employers as fellow members of an in-
group.  The vast majority of jurors are more likely to be employees and not employers or 
managers, or at least employees in addition to being managers.  Thus, jurors are less likely 
to identify with the employer.  Third, judges are left wholly to their own discretion in 
deciding how the law applies to the facts.  Jurors are given instructions, which can be 
designed to guide that application in a way that would avoid the effects of cognitive bias. 
 156. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829-30 
(2001). 
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instances with greater economic interests at stake result in 
tightly bound rules providing less stable outcomes than do more 
loosely defined principles.157  It is difficult, the more strict and 
specific the rules, to apply them to situations that vary from the 
model for which the rules were designed.  Certainly, the 
workplace is a complicated environment, particularly when 
discrimination is at issue.  The norms governing what constitutes 
discrimination are in flux; any workplace’s system of 
interpersonal interaction will be highly complex, and every case 
has high economic stakes.  Given the complicated nature of the 
issues then, employment discrimination cases are much better 
suited to broader principles than bound rules. 
The test might also give judges difficulty by requiring them 
to define what discrimination is, something the current 
McDonnell Douglas test does not explicitly require as part of the 
legal analysis.  However, underlying every single judgment as to 
what inferences can be drawn and where the pieces of evidence 
fit, is the judge’s view of discrimination.  And that view is never 
exposed or subject to challenge.  So giving the parties the 
opportunity to present expert testimony on what discrimination 
is and how it operates will result at the very least in 
documentation in the record about what definition of 
discrimination a judge is using.  This, in turn will foster public 
debate, may lead to congressional action, and could lead us 
closer as a society to consensus on the issue.  For example, one 
of the most noteworthy things about Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins158 is that Hopkins presented expert testimony on 
cognitive bias and the operation of stereotypes, and this 
evidence influenced the Supreme Court’s discussion of why the 
beliefs held about Hopkins were discriminatory.159  After Price 
Waterhouse, more people, judges included, understand better 
how stereotypes are manifestations of discrimination. 
Another consequence of the test is that fewer cases will be 
disposed of on summary judgment, and thus, more cases will go 
to trial.  While this increase in the federal court caseload might 
appear to be a bad outcome due to a desire for judicial 
 
 157. See John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles:  A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 
AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 47 (2002). 
 158. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 159. Id. at 235-36, 251-52. 
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efficiency, the answer is not to grant summary judgment more 
frequently.  Meritorious cases with evidence on both sides 
should go to trial.160  That is what the statute requires and the 
purpose served by the summary judgment procedure.  If 
caseloads are too heavy, the government should create more 
judicial positions, more ancillaries to judges, or an 
administrative adjudication procedure.  It should not allow trial 
by affidavit.161 
Using this test will also make the inquiry at trial much 
more straightforward.  At trial, the factfinder should focus 
simply on whether the plaintiff has shown that the employer 
took the adverse job action for a reason related to 
discrimination.  That is the only inquiry that matters, as the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear.162  Moreover, using 
this test resolves the question of how to incorporate the 
employer’s affirmative defense, that it would have taken the 
same action without the prohibited reason, which the Supreme 
Court recently made clear applies in circumstantial cases as well 
as direct evidence cases.163  Without the trips and traps of 
McDonnell Douglas, the real issues can come out, and courts 
can take a much more realistic look at discrimination in the 
workplace. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As these examples demonstrate, while the McDonnell 
Douglas test was originally designed to recognize the subtlety of 
discriminatory practices and to make the inquiry into the 
employer’s intent easier, it has instead frustrated the operation of 
our antidiscrimination laws.  The alternative test that I propose 
restores the original understanding of the Court, that 
discrimination operates throughout our society and that when the 
 
 160. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche’s Eroding Our Day in Court and 
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (arguing that courts are relying 
on summary judgment to resolve factual issues); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary 
Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141 (2000) (making the same argument). 
 161. See Mollica, supra note 160, at 152 (quoting Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. 
Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 162. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). 
 163. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003). 
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most common reasons for an adverse employment action are 
rejected, all that remains is an inference that discrimination was 
the real reason.  The ultimate burden on the plaintiff is the same, 
and the employer retains the same opportunity to suggest that 
the real reason was a legitimate one, but the courts’ perspective 
better reflects the pervasive and subtle nature of discrimination 
in the workplace. 
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